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1. Introduction
Grossman and Hart (1986) developed the incomplete contracts approach to
analyze the costs and benefits of vertical integration, which could explain why
firms have boundaries, and why not all transactions are taking place within a
single firm. The basic idea is that contracts cannot specify all states of nature
or all actions in advance, or there are states of nature or actions which can-
not be verified ex post by third parties, and which therefore are not ex ante
contractible. They used this approach to develop theories of ownership and
vertical integration. When contracts cannot specify all possible uses of an as-
set, the contract must ex ante leave some discretion over the use of the assets:
in other words it must allocate ownership of the asset to one or the other party.
The benefit of integration is that the owner avoids hold-up by the other party,
which in turn will enhance her incentives to invest in the relationship. The cost
is that the other party will tend to under-invest in the relationship.
In this paper we show how the incomplete contract approach can be used
to think about the internal organization of firms. The first half has a theoreti-
cal focus; we look at how formal and real authority are allocated between the
firm’s owner and its employees, between the top managers and sub-ordinates,
and between firms and financiers. We also examine how the allocation of au-
thority affects communication within the firm.
In the second half of the paper we analyze some of the empirical litera-
ture, examining first the determinants of organization (focusing on delega-
tion/decentralization) from the perspective of the Grossman-Hart approach and
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its extensions, and second the effects of decentralization on firm performance.
The emphasis is on looking at “stylized facts” from large-scale econometric
studies of firms rather than at case studies. Case studies are helpful in sug-
gesting theoretical approaches and mechanisms, but are poor for hypotheses
testing as they are small in number and highly selective. As with the theory,
we also look at decentralization within firms, rather than the more commonly
studied issue of boundaries of the firm or vertical integration, which was the
original motivation for Grossman and Hart (1986). 1 We find some support
for aspects of the incomplete contracts approach in the importance of the con-
gruence of preferences and firm heterogeneity for decentralization. However,
we acknowledge that there are many other stylized facts from the empirical
decentralization literature that may require alternative theoretical perspectives.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines theory. We look
at delegation and authority (2.1), financial contracting (2.2), and delegation and
the informational content of decision making (2.4).2 Section 3 examines the
empirical determinants of firm decentralization, focusing on some predictions
of the theory (such as the importance of preference congruence as proxied by
trust). Section 4 analyzes the effect of decentralization on firm performance.
In Section 5 we conclude and suggest areas for future research.
2. Theory
2.1 A model of delegation and authority in organizations
2.1.1 Basic model Real authority, i.e. the ability to make decisions, requires
information. But acquiring information in turn requires time and effort. Thus,
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for example, the CEO of a big holding company that consists of several hori-
zontally integrated units, can only devote limited attention to each unit, which
in turn implies that more real authority will lie with downstream agents in each
unit. In fact, increasing the “span of control” is one way in which a top man-
ager can commit to leave more real authority, and therefore more initiative, to
her subordinates in various branches of activity. More generally, it is the design
of the organization, together with the allocation of formal decision rights, that
will determine how real authority is distributed within the firm.
The issue of real versus formal authority and of the implications of this
distinction for the optimal design of firm organization is addressed by Aghion
and Tirole (1997) using an incomplete contracts/property rights approach.
Their basic framework involves two parties: P(principal) and A(agent). It is
assumed that formal authority can be allocated contractually (e.g. shareholders
allocate authority to the board of directors). In turn, boards allocate authority to
management – and management to different layers of management, and so on.
By contrast, real authority is exerted by the party which has information; this
may be the party with formal authority, but not neccessarily so. Contractual
incompleteness is again key to the whole analysis: contracts signed ex ante
between P and A cannot specify particular project choices, as these are not
verifiable by third parties.
After the contract is signed, both P and A can invest in information acqui-
sition: by investing effort 12E
2; P acquires information with probability E:
Similarly, by investing effort 12e
2; A acquires information with probability e:
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An important parameter in the analysis of the costs and benefits of delegating
formal (or real) authority to A is the degree of congruence between P’s and A’s
preferences. Let  denote the probability that P’s preferred project is also A’s
preferred project (call this congruence between the two parties’ preferences),
and suppose that a party gets zero utility if the other party chooses her preferred
project and preferences are not congruent. Finally, assume that an uninformed
party will never pick a project at random as this might be too risky.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, the two parties sign a contract that
allocates formal authority to one party, either P or A. Then, both parties invest
in information acquisition, i.e. P and A choose E and e respectively. Then, if
she acquires information, the party with no formal authority proposes a project
to the party with formal authority. The party with formal authority then either
picks her preferred project (if she herself has acquired information) or she
picks the project proposed to her by the party without formal authority if she
did not acquire information. It is in this latter case that real authority differs
from formal authority, since the project is actually chosen by the party without
formal authority (the party with formal authority is uninformed and therefore
can only rubberstamp the other party’s project proposal).
P delegating formal authority to her agent A involves a cost and a benefit.
The cost is that the agent may choose a project which the principal does not
prefer. This is the loss of control effect. The benefit is that delegating formal
authority to the agent encourages her to invest more effort (i.e. higher e) in
information acquisition. This is the initiative effect. Which effect dominates
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depends upon the congruence parameter  : there exists a cut-off value 
such that for  < , the first effect dominates, and it is better for P to retain
formal authority, whereas for  > , the second effect dominates and it is
better for P to delegate formal authority to A.
Since preference congruence turns out to be so critical for decentralization
decisions, we examine this in the empirical section where there does appear
to be some compelling evidence for the importance of empirical proxies for
congruence, such as trust. Below we show that this is a robust prediction of
generalizations to the basic theoretical approach.
2.1.2 Extensions Subsequent to Aghion and Tirole (1997), AT, several pa-
pers have analyzed the allocation of formal authority internally in organiza-
tions. We shall describe some of these attempts in the next subsections. At this
stage, let us mention a first attempt by Hart and Moore (1999), HM. HM ana-
lyze the optimal allocation of authority in multi-layer hierarchies. Their model
is one where by assumption, upstream agents are less likely to get new ideas
(getting an idea in HM is like obtaining information in AT) due to their higher
span of control. However, when they do get an idea, this idea has higher po-
tential because of their greater span. HM then show that it is optimal to have
“chains of commands”, whereby whenever they have an idea, upstream agents
(the “generalists”) have priority rights over implementing the idea; only if they
don’t gave an idea can downstream agents (the “specialists”) have their say
on which action to implement. The intuition is that although upstream agents
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are less likely to get a new idea, having priority control rights makes sure that
they are in control of all the assets downstream, which in turn allows them to
fully realize the idea’s potential. But if they fail to get a new idea, then the next
downstream agent on each branch of the hierarchy should have her say if she
has an idea, and so on, moving down in the hierarchy.
So far, we have concentrated on the allocation of formal authority within
organizations. However, going back to AT, it could be that delegating formal
authority to A is too costly to P, for example because with arbitrarily small
probability, A might take some very costly action. In that case P will always
want to retain formal authority, but yet she may want to commit herself not
to invest too much in information acquisition, so as to preserve the A’s incen-
tives to invest in e even though she keeps formal authority with herself. One
way to achieve such commitment is through the choice of span of control.
More specifically, by increasing the span of control, i.e. the number of agents
and activities under her supervision, the principal will commit to limiting how
much effort she devotes to acquiring information on each particular activity.
This in turn will encourage initiative by agents on each activity, as they an-
ticipate that the principal will ignore their proposals less often (as she will
not have acquired the relevant information). The choice of the optimal span of
control by the principal at date zero is in turn subject to the same trade-off be-
tween the principal’s loss of control and the agents’ initiatives as above. This
trade-off also underlies other features of organizational design, such as the role
of intermediaries, the costs and benefits of having multiple principals on some
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activities, or the optimal combination of tasks within teams.
The idea that the design of organizations can serve as a commitment device
to delegate (real) authority, is further explored by Acemoglu et. al. (2007), who
use it to test their theory of the determinants of decentralization on French and
British firm-level panel data (see Section 3 for more empirical detail). The
model, closely related to AT, is one in which the owner of a firm in a given
sector can learn about the outcome of an investment decision through observ-
ing other firms in the same sector, or by relying on the superior information of
downstream agents (or on downstream agents’ effort to acquire information)
within the firm. The more precise the public information acquired through ob-
serving other firms in the same sector, the less a firm needs to delegate control
to its better informed agent. This simple observation delivers a rich set of pre-
dictions on the determinants of decentralization. In particular it suggests that
older firms should delegate less, as these firms will have had time to learn from
more predecessors in the same sector. It also suggests that greater the firm het-
erogeneity in the same sector, the more a firm in that sector should delegate
control as what it observes from other firms is less likely to be relevant for its
own choices (if firms are very different it is harder for them to learn from each
other). Finally, it suggests that a firm closer to the technological frontier should
delegate control more, as it is more likely to face problems that have not been
solved before by other firms in the same sector. In the empirical section below
we discuss the empirical tests of these three predictions and show that they all
receive support in the data.
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Even if decentralization was the efficient choice due to characteristics of
the firm’s environment, Baker et. al. (1999) emphasize that delegation is often
informal because the corporate head quarters (CHQ) must usually sign-off on
decisions. The issue is whether the CHQ credibly commits to allowing the
plant manager to effectively make important decisions and does not override
the plant manager (in order to establish her reputation of not interfering). Thus,
the extent of decentralization is the outcome of a repeated game between the
CHQ and manager. Again, trust may facilitate a cooperative outcome to this
repeated game, which suggests that regions or countries which have higher
levels of trust should enjoy greater firm decentralization.
Another reason why delegating formal authority within firms may be diffi-
cult is explained by Bolton and Dewatripont (2011): nothing prevents a prin-
cipal (the owner of a firm) who delegates formal authority to an agent to revert
her decision at any time. Bolton and Dewatripont point to the so-called Busi-
ness Judgment Rules, which prevent courts from enforcing contracts between
several parties within the same firm. On the other hand, there are instances
where transfer of formal authority can be enforced nevertheless. First, if this
transfer is accompanied by a transfer of information from the principal to the
agent, then this information transfer guarantees irreversibility of the transfer of
control (see Aghion et al., (2004) for a more detailed discussion of this point).
Second, in a more dynamic context, principals may want to establish a reputa-
tion for not reverting control allocation decisions over time, precisely to keep
the option of credible control transfers in the future. Third, as stressed by Hart
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and Holmstrom (2010), taking control back from an agent causes the agent to
become aggrieved which in turn may induce the agent to “shade”, i.e. to take
unobservable actions which are damaging to the firm. Finally, as pointed out by
Bolton and Dewatripont (2011), there are at least two examples of contracting
situations where Business Judgment Rules do not apply: financial contracting,
i.e. contracts between a firm and its investors, which we discuss in the next
sub-section, and universities, where the faculty are protected by contracts and
tenure commitments which grants them academic freedom (see Aghion et al.,
2008 and Appendix A of Aghion et al. 2013).
2.1.3 Summary and empirical implications There are many other important
theoretical aspects of firm delegation stemming from GH and AT. The next
two sub-sections will focus on finance and information, as space constraints
prevent us from elaborating on other important areas such as academia and
multi-divisional firms (the Appendices of Aghion et al., 2013, summarize these
contributions).
As a general point, although decentralization models in the GH-AT tradi-
tion generate a rich set of predictions, it is fair to say that relatively few of
these have been subject to rigorous empirical examination. One main reason
for this is that it is hard to develop empirical analogs of theoretical objects such
as decentralization, information and communication in one firm, let alone in
large-scale databases suitable for econometric analysis. In Section 3 we focus
on some areas where empirical progress has been made.
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2.2 Financial contracting and the role of contingent control allocations
Since the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958)–which suggested that the mix
of debt and equity a firm has does not affect its value–economists have won-
dered why most firms have some combination of debt and equity financing.
Debt has certain tax advantages (interest is typically tax deductible for the firm
but dividend payments are not), yet corporate debt was prevalent even before
corporate income tax existed. Why would firms have debt, then?
Aghion and Bolton (1992) develop an incomplete contracts model which
provides a rationale for holding debt. They argue that the mix of debt and
equity financing divide up the states of the world where debt and equity holders
have control of the firm’s assets. When times are good, and cash flows are
sufficient to meet interest payments, equity holders have control. When times
are bad, debt holders get control.
Suppose that an entrepreneur needs to finance a project that costs K = 10:
She does not have private wealth and thus needs funding from an outside in-
vestor. The investor cares only for monetary benefits, whereas the entrepreneur
only draws private benefits from taking various actions. Actions are not verifi-
able by a third party and therefore cannot be contracted upon ex ante. Hence,
all the initial contract can do is allocate control rights between the two parties.
The timing of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor can
be described as follows. At the contracting stage, the two parties write a finan-
cial contract which allocates control rights. The contract must be “feasible,”
i.e. it must satisfy the investor’s ex ante participation constraint (she must get
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at least as much as her outside option in expectation). Then the state of nature
is realized. Suppose there is a good state g and a bad state b, each of which
can occur with probability 1/2, and which state is realized is verifiable by a
third party. Then an action must be chosen. Suppose that only two actions can
be chosen: a1 and a2. Action a1 maximizes monetary revenue in all states,
whereas action a2 maximizes private benefits in all states. For example, let
(a; ) denote the monetary profit from taking action a in state ; and B(a)
denote the private benefit from taking action a in any state  and suppose that
(a1; g) = 11; (a1; b) = 13
(a2; g) = 10; (a2; b) = 6
and
B(a1) = 2 < B(a2) = 4
The first best involves a1 being chosen in state b and a2 being chosen in
state g; since
B(a1) + (a1; b) = 15 > 10 = B(a2) + (a2; b)
whereas
B(a1) + (a1; g) = 13 < 14 = B(a2) + (a2; g):
We can now compare three governance structures, which correspond to three
types of financial contracts. Entrepreneur control (e.g. as implemented through
issuing non-voting shares), would lead to action a2 being chosen in all states,
Incomplete Contracts and theInternal Organization of Firms 13
but this would violate the investor’s participation constraint since
1
2
(6) +
1
2
(10) = 8 < 10 = K:
The investor has cash which he might use to convince the entrepreneur to
take action a1 in state b: However, if most of the bargaining power at the
renegotiation stage lies with the entrepreneur, the prospect of ex post renegoti-
ation will not help satisfy the investor’s ex ante participation constraint. In this
case, entrepreneur control is not ex ante feasible. How about investor control
(e.g. as implemented through issuing voting equity)? In this case the investor
will choose action a1 in all states, even though action a2 is the first best action
in state b; i.e. the action that maximizes the sum of monetary and private ben-
efits in that state. Now, can the entrepreneur renegotiate the action from a1 to
a2 in state g? The answer is no, simply because the entrepreneur has no cash
she can use to bribe the investor into changing his choice of action. Investor
control satisfies the investor’s participation constraint, since
1
2
(11) +
1
2
(13) = 12 > 10 = K:
However it is not first-best, as total surplus would be maximized by having
action a1 taken in state b and action a2 taken in state g:
Now, consider a contract that specifies a contingent allocation of control –
to the entrepreneur in state g and to the investor in state b: This contract will
lead to action a1 being taken in state b and action a2 being taken in state g:
Contingent control can in turn be implemented through a debt contract that
transfers control from the entrepreneur to the investor in state b:
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The idea that contingent control can help align incentives goes beyond fi-
nancial contracting. For example Bolton and Dewatripont (2011) restate the
Aghion-Bolton model as one of a headquarter who commits to replace a di-
visional manager only in some states of nature (e.g., in state b for the above
notation). Under this reinterpretation (B(a2) B(a1)) can be seen as the pri-
vate cost for the division manager of closing down his unit and thus having
his employees laid off, rather than maintaining the unit in operation. This con-
tingent arrangement reduces the expected monetary losses of the headquarters
and simultaneously internalizes the private costs of closing down units. In a
context where the information about  could be manipulated by the division
managers, for example through account manipulation or through risky deci-
sion making (gambling for resurrection) so as to avoid being replaced, contin-
gent control can help mitigate the problem by offering a guarantee to divisional
managers. Another guarantee is to give managers a stake in the firm’s profits
even when they are being replaced (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2011) and
Garicano (2000)).
2.3 Delegation as a way to improve the informational content of decision-making
Dessein (2002) analyzes how the allocation of control can help incorporate the
agent’s information into decision-making in a situation where the agent has
private information. In contrast to Aghion and Tirole (1997), there is no infor-
mation acquisition effort by the agent or the principal, therefore in Dessein’s
model the allocation of authority is not so much a tool to motivate the agent
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(as in Aghion and Tirole) or to give a supplier incentives to make relationship
specific investments (as in Grossman and Hart). The main insight of Dessein
(2002) is that in a world with asymmetric information and contractual incom-
pleteness, the delegation of authority from a principal to an agent is often the
best way to elicit the agent’s private information.
In Dessein’s setting the agent is assumed to be better informed, but with
preferences over decisions that are not fully congruent with those of the prin-
cipal. If the principal has authority (i.e. if she holds the decision rights), which
Dessein refers to as “centralization”, then the agent communicates his informa-
tion “strategically” in order to tilt the principal’s decision. Centralization thus
results in information loss. However, while “delegating” control to the agent
avoids this information loss, it also makes the agent’s biased decision-making
prevail. Delegation thus results in a loss of control. Dessein (2002) shows that
for a broad range of parameters, the loss of control under delegation matters
less than the loss of information under centralization. In particular, the smaller
the agent’s bias (i.e. the more congruent the principal’s and agent’s objectives
are), or the larger the agent’s informational advantage, or the more uncertainty
there is, the more likely it is that delegation is optimal.
An important assumption in Dessein (2002) is that under “principal author-
ity”, the principal cannot commit to not taking the decision which she be-
lieves maximizes her expected utility. She can, however, commit to “delegate”
control rights to the agent. This is consistent with the incomplete contracting
assumption that actions or decisions are non-contractible, even when control
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allocation is contractible. Delegation can then be interpreted as a commitment
device from the principal to use the agent’s information in the way that best
fits the agent’s objectives. While delegation results in biased decision-making
(this is the loss of control effect) it ensures that decision-making responds more
to the agent’s information. Compare this with centralized authority, which en-
sures an unbiased decision from the principal’s point of view but encourages
the agent to distort his information in order to influence the principal.
Information communication is modeled using Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s
model of strategic communication. Since decisions are non-contractible and
information is assumed to be soft, communication between the agent and prin-
cipal takes the form of “cheap talk”. However, strategic communication can be
informative if there is sufficient preference alignment between the agent (the
sender) and the principal (the receiver). Dessein’s contribution can be seen
as one of introducing control-rights considerations in strategic communication
games, with the idea that delegation induces communication by the agent to be-
come less “strategic”, although at the cost of non-congruent decision-making.
The result that delegation dominates when the agent’s bias is small is not
fully obvious: communication between the agent and principal is also better
under centralization in that case, as the agent gains less by distorting infor-
mation when her preferences are more congruent with those of the principal.
Yet Dessein (2002) shows that under general conditions, as long as the bias of
the agent is sufficiently small, delegation is always strictly preferred over cen-
tralization. For some specific cases, such as the leading example in Crawford
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and Sobel (1982), Dessein (2002) obtains the striking result that communica-
tion never takes place at the optimum: as long as preferences are sufficiently
congruent, the principal is strictly better off avoiding communication (and the
resulting information distortions) altogether, by committing to delegate control
to the agent.
Overall, this paper provides an important rejoinder to the central insight of
the property rights literature that the cost of integration (or centralization) are
the reduced incentives to either make relationship-specific investments (Gross-
man and Hart) or to acquire information (Aghion and Tirole). In Dessein (2002),
the cost of centralization (e.g. through integration), is the distortion and loss of
information.
3. Empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization
Recent empirical interest in decentralization has been stimulated by the growth
of a substantial body of evidence that documents persistence performance dif-
ferences among firms, even in narrowly defined industries (see Syverson, 2011;
Gibbons and Roberts, 2012 or Aghion et al., 2013, Appendix C). Could these
differences be due to different organizational structures within firms? This
section is organized as follows. Sub-section 3.1 focuses on the measurement
of firm decentralization, 3.2 on the impact of trust on decentralization, 3.3 on
empirical implication of learning models for decentralization and 3.4 docu-
ments more general “stylized facts” of decentralization. We formally discuss
identification issues in more detail in Appendix D of Aghion et al., 2013.
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3.1 Measuring firm decentralization
A key factor in any organization is who makes decisions. A centralized firm
is one were decisions are all taken at the top of the hierarchy, and a decentral-
ized firm is where decision-making is more evenly dispersed throughout the
corporate hierarchy.3
How can the concept of decentralization be implemented empirically? One
way is to look at the organization charts of firms (“organogram”) as graphical
representations of the formal authority structure. One of the best studies in
this area is Rajan and Wulf (2006) who use the charts of over 300 large US
corporations during 1987-1998 to examine the evolution of organizations (e.g.
the number of people who directly report to the CEO as a measure of the
span of control). Unfortunately, as Max Weber and (more recently as discussed
above) Aghion and Tirole (1997) stressed, formal authority is not the same as
real authority; the organogram may not reflect where real power lies.4
Observing whether a firm is decentralized into profit centers is useful, as
this is a formal delegation of power - the head of such a business unit will be
judged by the CEO on the basis of the unit’s profitability. Similarly if the firm
is composed of cost (or revenue) centers this indicates less decentralization as
only costs (or revenue) are likely to be under control of the manager. If the
firm does not even delegate responsibility to a cost or revenue center this indi-
cates a very centralized company. Acemoglu et al. (2007) use this distinction
to classify firms in their empirical work on French and British firm panel data.
Whether a company is organized into profit centers is a rather crude indica-
Incomplete Contracts and theInternal Organization of Firms 19
tor of decentralization. A better (but more costly) approach is to directly survey
firms. Bloom et al. (2012b) measure decentralization between the plant man-
ager and the corporate central headquarters (CHQ). They asked plant managers
about their decisions over investment (maximum capital investment that could
be made without explicit sign off from central headquarters), hiring, marketing
and product introduction (the latter three on a scale of 1-5). This was conducted
at the same time as the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) management survey.
Bloom et al. (2012b) constructed an empirical summary of decentralization
combining these four measures into a single index by z-scoring each individual
indicator and z-scoring the average (so that the index has zero mean and unit
standard deviation). We followed their approach but combine their data with
additional waves of the World Management Survey conducted in 2007 and
2009 covering eight more countries.
«COMP: Place Fig. 1 about here»
«COMP: Place Fig. 2 about here»
Figure 1 shows that decentralization varies substantially across countries,
with the US, the UK and Northern European countries being the most decen-
tralized and Southern European and Asian countries the least. There is an even
wider spread of decentralization across firms within every country, as shown
in Figure 2.
Decentralization extends beyond just plant managers and the CHQ. For ex-
ample, one can also consider the autonomy of workers from the plant manager
following Bresnahan et al. (2002). Proxies for this dimension of decentraliza-
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tion include questions indicating greater worker control over the pace of work
and over the allocation of tasks.
3.2 Trust (congruence of preferences)
The Aghion-Tirole approach offers a natural implementation of incomplete
contracts to study decentralization within firms. One key parameter in fostering
decentralization is the congruence of preferences between principal and agent.
Other theoretical developments following Grossman-Hart such as Baker et al.
(1999) also support this idea. Finding empirical proxies for the congruence
parameter is challenging, but one possibility is to use measures of trust. In
recent years, economists have started to take cultural factors more seriously in
determining economic outcomes (Guiso et al., 2006; Greif, 1994). This stems
in part from the influence of Putnam’s (1993) work on the importance of social
capital. Empirically, generalized social trust as a proxy for social capital has
been found to be associated with many positive economic outcomes (e.g. see
Knack and Keefer, 1997, on trust and growth or Guiso et al., 2009, on trust and
foreign trade and investment).
Bloom et al. (2012b) examine the importance of trust, finding that higher
levels of trust in the region where a plant is located is associated with a sig-
nificantly greater degree of decentralization. As in many other papers, trust is
measured using the standard indicators from the World Values Survey which
asks random samples of individuals about generalized trust. These external
measures are matched to plant locations to obtain a measure of trust in the
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region. The authors also exploit the fact that their data contains many sub-
sidiaries of multinational firms to construct measures of trust in the country
of origin (the multinational’s headquarters) and the country of location (where
the affiliate is located). Both of these seem to matter for decentralization, but
the most powerful factor is the bilateral trust between country pairs, i.e. the
degree to which people from the subsidiary’s parent country trust people in
the country where the plant is located. Multinationals locating in countries that
are seen to be relatively highly trusted (after country location and origin dum-
mies are removed), are significantly more likely to decentralize. For example,
even though the UK is overall a relatively high trust country, multinationals
headquartered in the US (where Britain has a relatively good trust reputation)
tend to decentralize more towards their British affiliates than equivalent multi-
nationals headquartered in France (where for historical reasons Britain has a
relatively bad trust reputation).
These results suggest that trust can affect the internal structures of global
firms and that some aspects of organization are transplanted abroad, as sug-
gested by recent theories of international trade (e.g. Helpman et al., 2004). It
fits well with the idea that the congruence of preferences is a major determinant
of delegation.
Enforcement of contracts should further foster decentralization, and we do
in fact observe more delegation where there is stronger rule of law5. However,
contracts are never perfectly enforceable, which leaves a role for trust to help
generate more delegation. Recently, Bloom et al. (2012) ran field experiments
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on firms in India, and discovered that family size (in particular the number of
adult male family members) was the key determinant of firm size, probably
due to the importance of trust. Owners only trusted other family members to
make major managerial decisions as they worried that outsiders would steal
from the firm. Hence, the supply of (trusted) male family member time was
typically the binding factor for firm growth.
3.3 Learning
In the theory section we discussed an extension to the Aghion-Tirole approach
when considering how firms could learn either from other firms or from them-
selves. Acemoglu et al. (2007) examine three predictions from their model (i)
delegation should be greater when the industry is more heterogeneous (so it
is harder to learn from others); (ii) the firm is close to the frontier (so that
there are fewer other firms to learn from) and (iii) the firm is younger (so it
has less experience to learn from its own mistakes). Acemoglu et al. (2007)
measure decentralization using both formal measures of whether firms are or-
ganized into profit centers as discussed above (for French firms) and direct
survey measures of the power managers have over hiring decisions (for British
firms). In both samples they find decentralization is more likely in industries
that are more heterogeneous and for firms that are younger or closer to the
technological frontier.
«COMP: Place Fig. 3 about here»
«COMP: Place Fig. 4 about here»
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These results are illustrated in Figures 3-5 where the y-axis has the average
degree of decentralization in different bins of the relevant variables. In Fig-
ure 3 there is a reasonably clear positive relationship after the second decile
between decentralization and heterogeneity (as measured by the dispersion of
firm productivity growth). In Figure 4 decentralization appears to be higher
among firms closer to the technological frontier (as measured by the distance
of the firm’s productivity from the leading firm in the four digit industry). That
firms closer to the frontier should delegate more may also explain why sub-
sidizing higher education, in particular graduate education, is more likely to
be growth-enhancing if universities are more decentralized (see for example
Aghion et al., 2009). Figure 5 shows that older firms look more centralized
than younger firms, possibly because they have learned better what to do, so
there is less need of delegation to a local manager who is better informed but
may not pursue the principal’s interests.
3.4 Other empirical factors influencing decentralization
The development of the incomplete contracts approach as applied to firm de-
centralization appears to have some confirmation in the data. The congruence
of preferences (as proxied by trust) and heterogeneity (making it harder to
learn) both seem to foster decentralization. There are many other findings in
the literature on the empirical determinants of decentralization. These are not
so obviously implications of the Grossman-Hart approach, but it is worth con-
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sidering them.
3.4.1 Firm size and scope Some basic factors determine decentralization.
All else equal, a larger firm will require more decentralization than a small
firm. A sole entrepreneur does not need to delegate because she is her own
boss, but as more workers are added, doing everything herself is no longer
feasible. Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) stressed that decentralization
was a necessary feature of larger firms, because CEOs do not have the time to
take every decision in large firms (see also Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991).
Similarly as firms expand in their scope both geographically and in product
space, local information will become more costly to transmit so this will also
favor decentralization.
Most empirical findings support this. Bloom et al. (2012b) find that firm
size and plant size are both associated with a significant increase in their
decentralization index. Furthermore, plant managers in subsidiaries of for-
eign multinationals have more autonomy than similar plants of domestic non-
multinationals. They interpret this as an indicator that managing at a distance
is harder, inducing headquarters to give more autonomy to local managers.
3.4.2 Human capital Many models would predict that human capital should
be associated with decentralization. For example, more skilled workers will
have greater ability to take on more responsibility. When the environment
changes due to new technologies and organizational change is required, skilled
workers may be better at learning how to cope with the new organizational
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structure.
There is generally a robust and positive association of decentralization and
skills. For example, Bloom et al. (2012b) measure skills by the proportion of
people who hold a college degree and find this to be significantly correlated
with decentralization. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) examine the relationship
between skills and organization in some detail, arguing in favor of “skill biased
organizational change”: i.e. increases in the supply of human capital will tend
to increase delegation. To tackle the endogeneity problem, they use informa-
tion on the differential price of skilled vs. unskilled labor in the local market
(as indicated by the wage differential between college educated workers and
other individuals). They argue that this skill premium is partially driven by ex-
ogenous shifts in the supply of unskilled workers. For their sample of UK and
French firms they find that regions where skill premia are higher have a lower
probability of decentralization.
3.4.3 Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Garicano (2000)
formalizes the idea of the firm as a cognitive hierarchy. There are a number of
problems to be solved and the task is how to solve them in the most efficient
manner. The simplest tasks are performed by those at the lowest level of the
hierarchy, and the “exceptional” problems are passed upwards to an expert.
The cost of passing problems upwards is that communication is expensive.
The benefit of passing the problem upwards is that it reduces the cognitive
burden on lower level employees.
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This framework was designed to address the impact of ICT on firm organi-
zation. Interestingly, information technologies have different implications for
decentralization than communication technologies. Consider again the decen-
tralization decision between the CHQ and plant manager. When communica-
tion costs fall (for example through the introduction of e-mail or company in-
tranets), it is cheaper for the plant manager to refer more decisions to the CHQ.
So communication technologies should cause centralization. By contrast, tech-
nologies that make it easier for the plant manager to acquire information (e.g.
Enterprise Resource Planning software, ERP like SAP) means that decentral-
ization should increase. An example would be Lexis Nexis in law firms, which
enables junior lawyers to quickly find relevant cases without consulting a more
senior associate or partner.
Bloom et al. (2009) test this theory and find considerable empirical support.
Computer networks (reducing communication costs) significantly decrease de-
centralization to plant managers, whereas tools to help managers access more
information (like ERP) significantly increase decentralization.6
3.4.4 Product market competition Some authors such as Acemoglu et al.
(2007) argue that a cause of the aggregate increase in more decentralized or-
ganizations is rapid technological change. An alternative explanation is that
globalization and deregulation have increased the degree of product market
competition which has in turn stimulated organizational change. The theory
is ambiguous here. If competition has made swift decisions more important,
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then this will increase the salience of local knowledge, leading to greater de-
centralization under the framework discussed above (e.g. Aghion and Tirole,
1997). Similarly if competition aligns the incentives of agents more with the
principal, then the costs of decentralization may also fall. There are counter-
vailing forces, however. For example, a larger number of firms in an industry
aids yardstick competition, but it may also help learning in the Acemoglu et al.
(2007) framework, which will reduce the need to decentralize.
The empirical evidence, however, seems more clear cut. Bloom et al. (2010)
find a robust positive association between competition and decentralization us-
ing industry import competition, the inverse of the industry Lerner index, or
simply the number of perceived competitors. A similar positive correlation
was reported in Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Marin and Verdier (2008, 2009).
All of these are cross sectional studies, so the positive coefficient on compe-
tition could simply reflect unobserved variables correlated with competition.
Guadalupe and Wulf (2009) try to tackle this endogeneity problem using the
Rajan and Wulf (2006) panel dataset on the changing organizational structure
of firms over time. They argue that the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in
1989 constitutes an exogenous increase in competition for US firms in indus-
tries where tariffs were removed. Exploiting this policy experiment reveals that
competition is associated with their proxy for decentralization.
4. Organizational practices and firm productivity
How can researchers identify the effects of organizational structure (e.g. de-
centralization) on firm performance?7
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4.1 Correlations of performance and organizational practices: the basic identification
problem
Consider the basic production function as
qit = llit + kkit + ait (1)
Where q is ln(output), l is ln(labor) and k is ln(capital) of firm i at time t.
Assume that we can write the TFP term ait as
ait = 0 + mit + uit (2)
where mit is an organizational feature of the firm (such as decentralization)
and uit is an unobserved error. Together these equations imply
qit = 0 + llit + kkit + mit + uit (3)
This of course contains several assumptions. It assumes that the relevant orga-
nizational factor enters linearly, whereas organization could instead be affect-
ing the coefficients on the other factor inputs, and many theories (e.g. of com-
plementarity) would generate the same predictions. We discuss these below.
We will assume that we can deal with the econometric problems in estimating
the coefficients on the production function so that we have a consistent mea-
sure of total factor productivity (see Ackerberg et al. (2006), for a discussion of
recent contributions). Note that OLS estimates of (1) will generally be biased,
as E(mituit 6= 0).
The traditional strategy is to assume that mit is a firm fixed effect. So one
approach is simply to recover average firm TFP under this assumption and
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project it on some cross-sectional measure of management mi. This will indi-
cate whether there is an association between the two measures, but not whether
the relationship is causal. For example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show
that there is a robust relationship between TFP and their measure of manage-
ment quality, but they interpret this as an “external validity” test of the quality
of the management data rather than as any causal relationship.
An analogous strategy if there are time varying measures of organization
is to treat all the correlated unobservables as fixed, i.e. uit = i + "it with
E(miti) 6= 0 but E(mit"it) = E(mit"it 1) = 0. Then the fixed effect
model estimated in (say) first differences would be
ait = mit + "it (4)
which can be consistently estimated by OLS.
There are a huge number of studies that have correlated various aspects of
the firm’s performance on various aspects of its organizational form (e.g. the
survey in Lazear and Oyer, 2012). The better studies use micro data and pay
careful attention to measurement issues and need to control for many covari-
ates. For example, Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Black and Lynch (2001)
examine various aspects of “high performance” workplaces, mostly relating
to employee involvement, team work and meetings. Both papers look across
many industries and find no direct effect of these measures on performance
(in contrast to many case studies). As we discuss below, Ichniowski et al.
(1997), however, examined management practices and performance in 37 US
steel mills over time and found a link between upgrading to bundles of modern
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practices and improved performance, so the correlation evidence is mixed.
There remain several serious problems. First is the data constraint that mea-
suring organization is hard and finding data with time series variation even
harder. Second, the management proxies are measured with error, so this will
cause attenuation towards zero if the measurement error is classical. This bias
is exacerbated in first differences. Third, and most seriously, the factors that
cause variation in the propensity to adopt organizational practices will also
likely be correlated with those affecting TFP so the assumption is unlikely to
hold in most cases. The bias could be upwards or downwards (e.g. if firms do-
ing badly are more likely to innovate organizationally as argued by Nickell et
al., 2001).
There is no simple solution to these endogeneity problems as we fundamen-
tally need some exogenous identifying variation. Bloom et al. (2012) imple-
mented a gold standard randomized control trial in Indian textile plants. The
intervention was by high quality management consultants to improve a range
of management practices (as in Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) which appeared
to dramatically improve productivity. Most of the quasi-experiments have been
in labor economics. A good example is Lazear (2000) who looked at the in-
troduction of a pay for performance system for windshield installers in the
Safelite Glass Company. Lazear found that productivity increased by around
44%, with about half of this due to selection effects and half from the same
individuals changing behavior. More recently, Bandiera et al. (2007, 2009) en-
gineered a change in the incentive pay system for managers in farm. They have
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no contemporaneous control group, but can examine the behavior of individ-
uals before and after the introduction of the incentive scheme. Productivity
rose by 21% mainly with at least half due to improved selection (the managers
allocated more fields to the ablest workers rather than to their colleagues).
4.2 Complementarities between organizational practices
One of the key reasons why firms may find it difficult to adjust their orga-
nizational form is that there are important complementarities between sets of
organizational practices. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) build a theoretical struc-
ture where such complementarities (or more precisely, super-additivities) mean
that firms optimally choose clusters of practices that “fit together”. When the
environment change so that an entrant firm would use this group of optimal
practices, incumbent firms will find it harder – they will either switch a large
number of practices together, or none at all.
This has important implications for productivity analysis. The effects of in-
troducing a single practice will be heterogeneous between firms and depend
on what practices they already use. This implies that linear regressions of the
form of equation (3) may be misleading. To see this, consider two practices,
m1 and m2, whose relationship with productivity is such that TFP increases
only when both are used together.
ait = a0 + 1m
1
it + 2m
2
it + 12(m
1
it m2it) + uit (5)
One version of the complementary hypothesis is 1 > 0; 2 < 0; and
12 > 0, i.e. the disruption caused by just using one practice (m2it) could
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actually reduce productivity. A regression which omits the interaction term
may m1it m2it find only a zero coefficient on the linear terms.
The case study literature emphasizes the importance of complementarities.
Testing for their existence poses some challenges, however, as pointed out
most clearly by Athey and Stern (1998). A common approach is a regression
of practice 1 (m1it) on practice 2 (m2it) with a positive covariance (conditional
on other factors) indicating complementarity. It is true that complements will
tend to covary positively, but this is a very weak test. There could be many
other unobservables causing the two practices to move together. We need an
instrumental variable for one of the practices (e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2007),
but this is hard to obtain as it is unclear what such an instrument would be, i.e.
could it be legitimately excluded from the second stage equation? In classical
factor demand analysis we would examine the cross price effects to gauge
the existence of complements versus substitutes, i.e. does demand for practice
1 fall when the price of practice 2 rises (all else equal). There still remains
the concern that the price shocks could be correlated with the productivity
shocks, but such an assumption is weaker than assuming unobserved shocks
to the firm’s choice of practices are uncorrelated. Unfortunately, such tests are
particularly hard to implement because there are generally no market prices for
the organizational factors typically considered.
An alternative strategy is to work straight from the production function (or
performance equation more generally). Consider the productivity equation af-
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ter substituting in multiple practices:
qit = 0 + llit + kkit + 1m
1
it + 2m
2
it + 3(m
1
it m2it) + uit (6)
Ichniowski et al. (1997) estimate a version of equation (6) using very dis-
aggregate panel data on finishing lines in US steel mills, using eleven human
resource practices (including incentive pay, recruitment, teamwork, job flexi-
bility and rotation). Their measure of productivity is based on downtime - the
less productive lines were idle for longer. They find that introducing one or
two practices has no effect on productivity, but introducing a large number to-
gether significantly raises productivity. Although the endogeneity problem is
not eliminated, the controls for fixed effects, looking within one firm and using
performance data, helps reduce some of the more obvious sources of bias.
4.3 The role of ICT again
One of the key productivity puzzles of recent years has been why the returns
to the use of information and communication technologies appear to be so
high and so heterogeneous between firms and between countries. For example,
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) find that the elasticity of output with respect to
ICT capital is far higher than its share in gross output (see also Stiroh, 2002).
One explanation for this is that effective use of ICT also requires significant
changes in firm organization. Changing the notation of (6) slightly, we could
write
qit = 0 + llit + kkit + ccit + mm
2
it + cm(cit mit) + uit (7)
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with the hypothesis that cm > 0. This is broadly the position of papers in
the macro literature explaining the faster productivity growth of the US than
Europe after 1995 (e.g. Jorgenson et al., 2008).
Bresnahan et al. (2002) try to test this directly by surveying large US firms
on decentralization and team work (for a cross section) and combining this
with data on ICT (from a private company Harte-Hanks), and productivity
from Compustat. They find evidence that cm > 0, i.e. that computer capital
is more productive when firms have greater decentralization and team work.
Bloom et al. (2012a) broaden the sample to cover both the US and firms in
seven European countries, and find evidence of complementarity of ICT with
people management. They also show that their results are robust to controlling
for firm fixed effects. Careful econometric case studies (e.g. Baker and Hub-
bard, 2004; Bartel et al., 2007) also identify differential productivity effects
of ICT depending on organization form. Lemieux et al. (2009) show that one
particular people management practice, performance pay, is becoming increas-
ingly important in the US and has a significant impact on widening inequality.
They suggest that the spread of ICT innovations has facilitated the adoption of
performance pay techniques.
4.4 The role of human capital
One of the reasons for the renewed interest in organizational change by la-
bor economists was the attempt to understand why technology seemed to in-
crease the demand for human capital, thus contributing to the rise in wage
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inequality experienced by the US, UK and other countries since the late 1970s.
Many theories have been proposed (see Autor et al., 2003, for a review), but
one hypothesis is that lower IT prices increased decentralization for the rea-
sons outlined in Garicano (2000), and decentralization leads to an increase in
inequality (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Further, decentralization is
complementary with skills for at least three reasons. First, skilled workers are
more able to analyze and synthesize new pieces of knowledge, so the benefits
of local processing of information are enhanced. Additionally, skilled workers
are better at communicating, which reduces the risk of duplication of informa-
tion. Second, the cost of training them for multi-tasking is lower, and they are
more autonomous and less likely to make mistakes. Finally, workers who are
better educated may be more likely to enjoy job enrichment, partly because
they expect more from their job in terms of satisfaction.
This has three main implications:
1. Decentralization leads to skill upgrading within firms. This is due to the
fact that the return to new work practices is greater when the skill level
of the workforce is higher.
2. A lower price of skilled labor will accelerate the introduction of organi-
zational changes.
3. Skill intensive firms will experience greater productivity growth when
decentralizing.
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) find support for all three predictions. They
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estimate production functions (with the relevant interactions), skill share equa-
tions and organizational design equations. A novel feature of this approach is
that because labor is traded in a market, it is possible to use local skill price
variation to examine complementarity issues. They find that higher skill prices
make decentralization less likely, consistent with “skill-biased organizational
change”.
5. Conclusions
We began by surveying the theoretical literature on the organization of firms
and the optimal decentralization of decision rights within firms. We discussed
how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes this organization of decision
making within firms. In particular, the inability to contract over all possible
states of the world leads principals to delegate control to agents as a way to
ex ante commit to letting agents expropriate some of the returns from costly
activities, like collecting information on the best actions to take.
We then overviewed some of the empirical evidence on the organization and
management of firms, focusing on decentralization. We looked at within firm
organization, especially decentralization following the theoretical survey, and
we also looked at econometric studies, focusing on large scale firm databases
rather than case studies. There has recently been a number of papers measur-
ing management and organizational practices across firms and countries. Like
productivity, decentralization varies a lot across firms and countries (e.g. Scan-
dinavian and Anglo-Saxon firms are more decentralized than those from Asia
and Southern Europe). A number of factors highlighted in the incomplete con-
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tract theory are shown to be important for accounting for differences in firm
organization - in particular heterogeneity and the congruence of preferences
(as proxied by trust). Several other factors appear robustly positively correlated
with decentralization, such as product market competition, human capital and
firm size.
In terms of future work, we see two areas of opportunity. First, there is a
need to match up empirical work more closely with the theory. Until recently,
comprehensive datasets on measures of organization across many firms and
countries were unavailable. Now that this gap in the core data infrastructure
is being covered, there is a great opportunity for testing some of the theories
of organizational economics. This is challenging, first because many of the
important aspects in the environment emphasized in the theoretical literature
are hard to match into empirical counterparts, and second because identifying
the causal relationship between organizational changes and firm outcomes like
productivity and growth is difficult. Even with strong measurement and tight
links to theory, it is essential to identify the direction of causality in some of
stylized empirical results we have identified above - for example, do skilled
managers enable more decentralized decision making, or are skilled managers
attracted to more decentralized firms? We see the theory and empirics of the
organization of the firm as one of the key growth areas in economics over the
next twenty-five years.
Notes
1See Lafontaine and Slade (2008) for a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on
this.
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2In Aghion et al. (2013) Appendices A and C we also discuss work on academia and multi-
divisional firms.
3An extreme case of decentralized “organization” is an idealized market economy where atom-
istic individuals make all the decisions and form spot contracts with each other. The origin of many
of the debates on decentralization have their origins in the 1930’s, over the relative merits of a mar-
ket economy relative to a centrally planned one.
4We focus on decentralization as distinct from managerial spans of control. These are distinct
concepts – the span and depth (number of levels) of a hierarchy are compatible with different
power relationships between the levels. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the move towards
delayering over the last twenty years has been associated with decentralization (see Rajan and
Wulf, 2006).
5See Bloom et al., (2009). More generally on the importance of law and reputation on contract
enforceability see MacLeod (2007).
6The magnitude of the effect is substantial. An increase in ERP usage by 60% (the average
difference in ICT between Europe and the US) increases a plant manager’s autonomy by an amount
equivalent to the increase in US college graduates between 1990 and 2000.
7Aghion et al (2013) Appendix D discusses general identification issues in this literature in
more detail.
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